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A significant challenge to empirically testing theories of discrimination has been the difficulty of identifying
taste-based discrimination and of distinguishing it clearly from statistical discrimination.  This paper
addresses this problem through a two-part empirical test of taste-based discrimination.  First, it constructs
measures of revealed preferences, which establish that World War I created a strong and persistent
shock to ethnic preferences that effectively switched the status of German Americans to an ethnic
minority.  Second, the paper uses this shock to ethnic preferences to identify the effects of taste-based
discrimination at the example of traders at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  A new data set
of more than 4,000 applications for seats on the NYSE reveals that the War more than doubled the
probability that German applicants would be rejected (relative to Anglo-Saxons).  The mechanism
of taste-based discrimination is surprising: Prices are unaffected by ethnic preferences, and discrimination







pmoser@stanford.eduAlthough empirical tests of discrimination have shown that minorities are disadvantaged 
in hiring decisions (e.g., Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004)
1 it 
has proven difficult to establish whether such differences result from biased preferences 
and thus reflect taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957).  Taste-based discrimination is 
especially hard to distinguish from statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow 1973; 
and Aigner and Cain, 1977), where ethnicity serves as a signal for unobservable 
productivity differences.
2  The greatest obstacle to identifying the effects of taste-based 
discrimination in labor markets has been the lack of exogenous shocks to ethnic 
preferences.  
This paper presents a two-part test of taste-based discrimination that exploits 
exactly such a shock.  First, it shows that World War I (1914-1918) created a shock to 
ethnic preferences, which effectively switched German Americans from a well-
assimilated mainstream ethnicity to an ethnic minority.  Then, the empirical analysis uses 
this change in preferences to identify the effects of taste-based discrimination on an elite 
community that should be less vulnerable to discrimination: applicants for membership in 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
Three measures of revealed preferences establish that World War I resulted in a 
large and persistent shock to ethnic preferences.  The first measure is constructed from 
the records of 1,800 performances at the Metropolitan Opera in New York.  These data 
                                                 
1 Goldin and Rouse (2000) find that gender discrimination limits the hiring of female musicians in major 
orchestras, while Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) show that applicants with black-sounding names are 
less likely to be invited for job interviews.   
2 The most direct empirical tests of statistical versus taste-based discrimination come from laboratory 
experiments and the market for sports cards: Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) show that differential treatment 
is based on poor information (rather than tastes) by randomly assigning ethnicities to players in a dictator 
game.  In contrast, Nardinelli and Simon (1990) show that collectors of baseball cards pay more for cards 
featuring white players, even controlling for performance.  Combining experimental evidence with data on 
buyers and sellers of sports cards, List (2004) finds that lower offers to minority sellers reflect statistical, 
rather than taste-based discrimination.     
  1reveal that the share of operas by German-language composers fell from 50 to less than 
10 percent at the beginning of the war, and did not recover until the late 1920s.  The 
second measure is constructed from the names of newborn boys in the U.S. Census.  
These data show that the frequency of German-sounding names dropped dramatically 
after the beginning of the war.  The third measure relates to the consumption of ethnic 
foods.  It reveals that the consumption of sauerkraut declined to almost zero after the 
beginning of World War I.   
The empirical analysis uses this shock to preferences to test for taste-based 
discrimination among applicants to the NYSE.  To trade at the NYSE, applicants must 
buy one of a limited number of memberships or seats.  Prospective buyers negotiate a 
purchase price with a seat owner who wants to leave the Exchange.  The sale, however, is 
conditional on the remaining members’ assessment of the buyer’s “personal and financial 
integrity.”  This paper uses a differences-in-differences approach to test whether the 
probability of approval was affected by a shift in ethnic preferences.   
Data on more than 4,000 applications to the NYSE between 1883 and 1936 show 
that the war more than doubled the probability that German Americans would be rejected 
(relative to Anglo-Saxons).  In regressions of the probability of rejection on ethnicity 
variables and a variety of controls, interaction terms between World War I and German 
ethnicity are consistently large, positive, and significant.  No other ethnicity variables 
yield significant effects.  Results of differential treatment are robust to controls for stock 
market conditions through time-fixed effects.   
Changes in productivity cannot explain the increase in rejections.  Specifically, 
one may worry that the war lowered the productivity of German American traders if they 
  2were more dependent on business with Germany.  To test this, I examine rates of 
business failures and exits from the Exchange.  These data show that Germans who were 
already members did not fail in business or exit the NYSE at higher rates than other 
members.  Moreover, the share of German applicants increased after 1914, which 
suggests that Germans did not perceive their productivity to be at risk.   
The data also show that Jewish Germans suffered an even stronger effect than did 
other Germans.  All Jewish applicants were also more likely to be rejected at all times.  
These findings indicate that the war amplified an existing ethnic bias. 
At the same time, the empirical results suggest that discrimination operates 
through a mechanism that is somewhat unexpected.  The data indicate that prices remain 
unaffected by taste-based discrimination, even though admissions change substantially.  
This difference stems from the structure of the admissions process.  Applicants negotiate 
prices with sellers who exit the Exchange, but they are evaluated by their future peers, 
whom they cannot compensate.  Similar set-ups are present in many labor market settings 
where co-workers hold discriminatory tastes.  The results of this paper suggest that taste-
based discrimination will continue to affect the labor market outcomes of minorities in 
such settings, even if regulation ensures equality in wages. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the NYSE’s 
process of admissions.  Section II introduces the data on admissions and on seat prices.  
Section III presents three alternative measures to quantify changes in ethnic preferences.  
Section IV summarizes the results of linear probability and logit regressions of rejections 
on applicants’ ethnicities and controls.  Section V presents comparable regressions for 
seat prices, and section VI concludes. 
  3I. The NYSE’s Process of Admissions 
  The first mention of the New York Stock Exchange occurred in The Diary, or 
Loudon’s Register in March 1792: 
The Stock Exchange Office is opened at No.22 Wall Street for the accommodation of the 
dealers in Stock, and in which Public Sales will be held daily at noon…
 (Eames 1894, p.13) 
 
Only two months later, on May 17, traders agreed to deal exclusively with each other.  
By 1879, the Exchange had grown to include 1,100 traders (Eames 1894, pp.14 and 43).
3  
Membership remained constant until 1929, when the NYSE granted every member the 
right to sell one quarter of a new membership during the so-called Quarter Dividend Sale, 
which increased the number of seats to 1,375 (Davis, Neale, and White 2007). 
  Francis L. Eames, President of the Exchange from 1894 to 1898, describes the 
basic requirements of membership: 
Any person, at least twenty-one years of age, and a citizen of the United States, may buy a 
membership in the Stock Exchange from any member desiring to sell, subject to the approval 
of the Committee of Admissions.  (Eames 1894, p.68) 
 
Eighty percent of all transactions between 1883 and 1936 were negotiated directly 
between sellers and prospective buyers.  The remaining twenty percent were sold in an 
anonymous auction, which was administered by the Committee of Admissions.  These 
seats were typically owned by a member who had died, failed in business, or been 
expelled.  Then,  
…his membership may be sold by the Committee, creditors who are members of the Exchange 
having a first lien upon the proceeds. (Eames 1894, p.68) 
 
                                                 
3 Seats had become saleable in 1869, when the first memberships sold for 8,000 dollars (ca. 100,000 dollars 
in 2005).  Seats within the Exchange had become saleable eight years earlier, in October 1861.  At that 
time, each member occupied a specific chair on the trading floor (Eames 1894, p.43).  The leasing of seats 
is a recent phenomenon, which the NYSE began to permit in 1978.  
  4In both types of transactions, the NYSE receives a fixed initiation fee from the buyer, 
which is independent of the purchase price.  This fee remained stable at around 20,000 
year 2005 dollars.   
Once buyers and sellers have agreed on a price, the NYSE’s 15-member 
Committee of Admissions evaluates the buyer’s “personal and financial integrity” 
(Eames 1894, p.51).  Sellers deal with applicants only for as long as it takes to negotiate 
the price of the seat.  The remaining members, however, who are represented by the 
Committee, evaluate buyers as potential trading partners.  An anonymous trader explains 
the importance of trust in this setting:  
Character is essential to the Stock Exchange member.  He buys and sells in a milling, excited 
crowd around a trading post, and his contracts are oral.  None is written and he must stand by 
his word of today, even though his transaction will show him a loss tomorrow.  (New York 
Times, August 24, 1924) 
 
To ascertain a buyer’s integrity, the NYSE interviews the applicant along with two 
members who recommend him “in every way as a proper person to be admitted to the 
Exchange” (Minutes of the Committee of Admissions 1904).
4  The committee also asks 
whether the sponsors would “accept (the applicant’s) uncertified check for $20,000 
(equivalent to 2.8 million in 2005 U.S. dollars) if he were alone in business and a 
member of the Exchange” (Minutes of the Committee of Admissions 1904).
5  Buyers also 
confirm that they are in good health and not currently members of a competing exchange.  
Typically, the Committee meets every two weeks, interviews two to three 
applicants, and decides on them in the next meeting.  Until 1936, anonymous ballots are 
                                                 
4 I use male pronouns because there were no female applicants to the NYSE during this period.  The first 
female trader, Muriel Siebert, entered the Exchange in 1967. 
5 Prices are converted to real prices using nominal GDP per capita (Williamson 2007). 
  5recorded as white balls in favor of an applicant and black balls against.  If more than one 
third of the votes are black balls, the application is rejected.
6   
 
II. World War I as a Shock to Preferences 
  World War I created a shift in ethnic preferences that can be used to identify the 
potential effects of taste-based discrimination.  Prior to 1914, German Americans were a 
prominent part of the ethnic mainstream. 
Public opinion had come to accept the Germans as one of the most assimilable and reputable 
of immigrant groups.  Repeatedly, older Americans praised them as law-abiding, speedily 
assimilated, and strongly patriotic….In 1908, a group of professional people, in rating the 
traits of various immigrant nationalities, ranked the Germans above the English and in some 
respects judged them superior to the native whites.  (Higham 1998, p.196) 
 
After August 5, 1914, when Germany attacked Belgium, respect gave way to 
hostility.  On April 5, 1918, The St. Louis Globe-Democrat reports the attack of Robert 
Praeger: “German Enemy of U.S. hanged by mob.”
7  Praeger’s was the only lynching, 
but other types of abuse, such as tarring and feathering, occurred dozens of times.  Fra
Brocke, a German American farmer, recalls in an interview:  
nk 
                                                
I would say you suffered more for the fact if you were of German descent more than anything 
else (sic). That was the hardest part we had to play with it…there was a lot of propaganda 
against the German people. And we had to be so careful…It was just that there was a lot of 
hatred against the Germans and if you were German, you were a little bit tinted, I guess. (Oral 
history project of the Latah County Historical Society, http://users.moscow.com/lchs/)  
 
During the war Germans were also barred from many social clubs that they had 
previously dominated.  In New York, the Chemists’ Club, the Lamb Club, and the New 
York Athletic Club expelled all German-born members, and banned the use of German 
on their premises (New York Times, April 11, 20, and May 5, 1918).  The war’s effect on 
 
6 To vote, the Committee required a quorum of 10 members.  
7 Hickey 1969.  Also see Chicago Daily Tribune (April 5, 1918) and New York Times (April 4, 1918).   
  6the use of the German language persisted well into the 1920s.  In 1916, 13,800 students 
studied German in Cincinnati; by 1917, this number had fallen to 7,000.  Mothers lobbied 
to prohibit the teaching of German, and in 1919, it became illegal to teach German in 
Ohio, Iowa, and Nebraska (Wittke 1936, pp.179-190).  These prohibitions remained in 
place until 1923, when the Supreme Court ruled them to be unconstitutional (Meyer vs. 
State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 1923).
8  
To measure the strength and persistence of these changes in tastes, I construct two 
quantitative measures of ethnic preferences.  The first measure counts the share of operas 
by German-language composers. 
 
A. The Share of German-language Operas at the Met 
  In the early years of the 20
th century, German-language composers dominated the 
repertoire of the Metropolitan Opera (Figure 1).  In 1910, 19 in 44 operas were by 
German-language composers.
9  Nine of these were by Richard Wagner, including 
Lohengrin, Tannhäuser, and Tristan und Isolde.  From 1910 until early 1917, half of the 
                                                 
8 Changes in the circulation of ethnic newspapers confirm this shift in status.  At a time when the number of 
mother-tongue publications increased among 13 major ethnic groups, the circulation of German-language 
publications decreased (Kirschbaum 1986, p.72; Wittke 1936, p.115).  In May 1918, the American Defense 
Society and the American Relief Legion petitioned President Wilson to ban the publication of German 
language newspapers (New York Times, May 9, 1918).  Moreover, American cities, such as Portland, 
Oregon, renamed any German-sounding streets, so that Portland’s Kaiser Street became Marne Way (New 
York Times, June 2, 1918; Wittke 1936, p.184).  In June 1918, Representative Smith of Michigan 
introduced a bill demanding that towns named Berlin, Germantown, or Bismarck be renamed Liberty or 
Victory.  Berlin, Iowa, was christened Lincoln and East Germantown, Indiana, became Pershing.   
9 Data are collected from historical schedules of performances in the online archives of the Metropolitan 
Opera in New York.  German composers include Carl Maria von Weber, Engelbert Humperdinck, 
Friedrich Handel, Friedrich von Flotow, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Hermann Goetz, Jacques Offenbach, Ludwig 
van Beethoven, Max von Schillings, Peter Cornelius, Richard Strauss, and Richard Wagner.  German-
language composers further include Austrian composers Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Ernst Krenek, Franz 
von Suppé, Johann Strauss Jr. and Franz Schubert and the Bohemian Christoph W. von Gluck.  Composers 
are assigned to ethnicities based on their country of birth, which means that Beethoven and Handel are 
counted as German, even though Beethoven was also active in Vienna and Handel in London.  Multiple 
performances of the same opera are counted as one.  In addition to opera houses, concert halls and radio 
stations also avoided German music, and musicians who performed German pieces risked violent protest 
(New York Times, October 3 and 19, 1919). 
  7Met’s operas were German.  In 1917 however, the share of German-language operas 
declined from 9 in 10 operas prior to the declaration of war to 4 in 33 afterwards.  This 
change is especially dramatic considering that it can take several years to prepare an 
opera.
10  In fact, two of the four German-language operas, Wagner’s Meistersinger and 
Tristan und Isolde, were performed within a week after the declaration of war.  The 
librettos of the two remaining German operas, Gluck’s Iphigenie and Flotow’s Martha, 
were translated into Italian.  In 1918, only 3 in 40 operas were by German composers.   
  Recitals of German-language music continued to decline for a few years after the 
Armistice at Compiègne on November 11, 1918.  In 1919, only 7 percent of the Met’s 
repertoire featured German-language composers.  In the following years, the proportion 
of German-language pieces recovered slowly, with 10 percent in 1920, 12 in 1921, and 
13 percent in 1922.  It took until 1923 for the share of German operas to recover to 25 
percent of the Met’s repertoire.   
The data also suggest that World War II did not have a similar effect on 
preferences.  In fact, the share of German-language operas continued to increase up to 46 
percent in 1945.  In that year, Hans W. Heinsheimer observed:  
The War – in marked contrast to World War I – has not interfered with the production of 
opera in German.  One of the marked highlights of last season was the complete presentation 
of Wagner’s ‘Ring,’ so successful that the whole circle had to be repeated.  Again, the greatest 
box office success of the current year has been a magnificent production of ‘Meistersinger,’ a 
magnificent success for conductor George Szell, and the stage manager, Herbert Graf.  The 
works of Richard Strauss likewise are much in the public favour.  (Heinsheimer 1945, p.8) 
 
Thus, the opera data indicate that only the First World War created a significant shock to 
ethnic preferences. 
 
                                                 
10 E.g., New York Times, January 20, 2008, citing Opera America. 
  8B. Children Named Wilhelm and Otto 
  Another measure of ethnic preferences can be derived from naming practices, 
which have been found to reflect attitudes towards ethnicities (Lieberson 2000).  To 
construct these data, I count newborns named Otto or Wilhelm between 1910 and 1919 
(United States Census 1920).  Both Otto and Wilhelm have prominent German 
connotations: Otto von Bismarck was Prussia’s Prime Minister from 1862 to 1890 and 
German Chancellor from 1867 to 1890.  Bismarck’s namesake was Otto I, King of the 
Germans from 936 to 973, who was succeeded by a long line of Ottos.  Wilhelm II was 
German Emperor at the beginning of the war; he had followed his grandfather Wilhelm I 
(1797 – 1888) to the German throne.   
  The number of boys named Otto and Wilhelm declined sharply after 1914 (Figure 
2).  From 1915 to 1916, Otto dropped by 34.7 percent, from 2,133 to 1,394, and Wilhelm 
declined by 35.0 percent from to 140 to 91.  At the same time, the number of boys named 
William, as the English equivalent to Wilhelm, increased by 3 percent from 2,269 to 
2,345.
11   
 
C. Sauerkraut  
  Data on the consumption of ethnic foods yield additional evidence for a change in 
taste.  U.S. consumption of sauerkraut – a traditional German cabbage dish – declined by 
75 percent between 1914 and 1918, causing New York’s grocers to complain that “There 
is enough sauerkraut in stock at the present time to feed a good-sized German army” 
(New York Times, April 25, 1918, p.10).  Other ethnically German foods were renamed to 
                                                 
11 As a further robustness check, I have compared the number of boys named Heinrich and Henry in the 
U.S. Census of 1910, 1920, and 1930.  While the number of Heinrichs declines between 1910 and 1920 and 
recovers only after 1920, the number of Henrys continues to increase during World War I.   
  9rescue sales.  Butchers marketed hamburgers as “liberty steaks”; pretzel manufacturers 
argued that pretzels had originated in an Italian cloister, and cheese merchants 
demonstrated that limburger came from Belgium (Wittke 1936, p.186). 
  Thus, changes in the consumption of ethnic German foods underscore the 
evidence from operas and naming practices, confirming that the war created a strong and 
persistent shift in ethnic preferences.  I exploit this shift to assess the impact of taste-
based discrimination, using the example of traders at the NYSE. 
 
III. The NYSE Data 
  The data consist of 5,097 applications to the NYSE between December 27, 1883 
and December 31, 1936, as well as separate data on the ethnicities of buyers and sellers.  
From 1883, all attempted sales were recorded in a ledger of transactions, which can be 
accessed at the NYSE archives in New York.  An entry in the ledger consists of the 
buyer’s name, the seller’s name, the price of the seat, the date of the application, the date 
of the decision, the decision, and the number of black balls and white balls that were cast.  
 
A. Description of the NYSE Data 
  This data set expands existing information on seat prices by including the names 
of buyers and sellers, their ethnicities, and the number of votes that were cast in favor and 
in opposition to each applicant.
12  The new data also comprise annotations that reveal 
whether a seat was auctioned by the Committee of Admissions, whether a seller had died 
                                                 
12 For example, Schwert (1977), Jarrell (1984), Golbe (1986), Keim and Madhavan (2000), and Davis, 
Neal, and White (2007) explore the effects of trading volumes and stock prices on the price of NYSE seats. 
  10or been expelled from the Exchange, and whether a seat was transferred for a nominal 
price, typically within a family or firm.
13  
  Figure 3 illustrates the movement of seat prices over time.  Between 1883 and 
1936, the average real price of a seat was 1.6 million dollars.  Prices rose from 420,000 
dollars in 1883 to 5.2 million dollars in 1929 and declined sharply thereafter.
14  Voting 
data show that rejection rates increased from 3 percent before the war to 4 percent during 
the war, and returned to 3 percent afterwards (Table 1).   
 
B. Names as a Measure of Ethnicity 
  I use names as a proxy for the ethnicity of buyers and sellers.  Names are matched 
with ethnicities by an algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming 
practices.
15  For example, surnames ending in “dda” or “ddo” are assigned to Sardinia 
and therefore Italy.  This process creates unique ethnicity matches for 84.2 percent of 
applicants, yielding a total of 4,290 observations.  Ethnicities are combined into four 
groups, Anglo-Saxon, German, Jewish, and Other Ethnicities.  Anglo-Saxon includes 
English, Scottish, and Irish names.  Other Ethnicities combines Dutch, Italian, Russian, 
along with smaller ethnic groups and other unmatched applicants.  I keep Jewish names 
separate from Other Ethnicities because Jewish applicants include German Jews. 
  Name data suggest that the NYSE was dominated by Anglo-Saxons until well into 
the 1930s (Figure 4).  In 1890, nearly two-thirds of NYSE traders were Anglo-Saxons; by 
                                                 
13 The share of nominal transfers increased from 11 percent before the war, to 17 percent during, and 21 
percent after the war (Table 1).  Since nominal transfers typically occurred within firms, they may have 
been subject to less stringent reviews by the NYSE, which will make it harder to detect discrimination. 
14 In 2005 U.S. dollars.  With the close of the market on December 30, 2005, the NYSE stopped selling 
seats in anticipation of becoming a publicly traded company.  
15 List Service Direct, Inc. (LSDI) at http://listservicedirect.com/ethnic_religious.html 
  111930, Anglo-Saxons continued to account for half of all traders.  The share of German 
members increased gradually from 6.1 percent in 1890 to 7.7 percent in 1900, 7.8 percent 
in 1910, 8.0 in 1920, and 8.4 percent in 1930.  The share of Jewish traders declined from 
8.6 percent in 1890 to 7.5 percent in 1920 and 7.6 percent in 1930 (Figure 4).  
 
C. Potential Weaknesses of the Data  
  The major weakness of the data is that names may be an imperfect measure of 
ethnicity.  Algorithms that assign names to ethnicities are optimized to match current-day 
naming practices; this will make it harder to detect discrimination during World War I.  
Expectations of discrimination may also discourage the use of ethnic-sounding names 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Levitt and Fryer 2004, p.770).  Census data have 
shown that the war reduced the popularity of German first names such as Otto or 
Wilhelm.  Similarly, Germans may have anglicized their last names to avoid 
discrimination.  On June 2, 1918, for example, the New York Times reports that “Loyal 
citizens who possess German forms of the patronymic are striking them out.”  Applicants 
with anglicized names are assigned to Other Ethnicities, which will make it harder to 
capture the effect of World War I on the treatment of Germans.  For example, Arthur 
Rittmaster, who applied to the NYSE in 1924 and was rejected, carried an anglicized 
version of the German name Rittmeister, which falls under Other Ethnicities.  
Another problem is that Jewish Germans are classified as Jewish rather than 
German applicants, even though they may have been discriminated against as Germans.  
To address this issue, I use historical shipping records to separate Jewish Germans from 
Other Jewish applicants.  In response to a surge in immigration after the British-
  12American War of 1812, Congress passed the Steerage Act of 1819, which required 
captains to submit lists of all passengers and ports of origins (Page 1911).  These 
documents, including Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York 1820-
1897, enable me to count arrivals by country of origin for each last name.
16  Arthur 
Schiff, for example, applied to the NYSE on December 15, 1932, and is identified as 
Jewish by the matching algorithm.  Shipping records show that 111 of 228 Schiff families 
came from Germany, 55 from Russia, 19 from Hungary, 17 from Poland, 13 from 
Austria, and 13 from Hessia (which is a German state).  Thus, Jewish applicants with the 
last name Schiff are assigned to the new ethnicity variable Jewish German.
17 
 
D. Three Time Periods 
  To examine the effect of World War I, the data are divided into three periods: pre-
WWI, WWI, and post-WWI.  The pre-WWI period begins with the first recorded sale of a 
NYSE seat on January 3, 1883, and extends to June 28, 1914, when Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo.  The NYSE closed for business a few days after 
the Archduke’s death and remained closed until November 28, 1914.  By that time, 
Germany had invaded Belgium and declared war on Russia and France.  WWI data 
include the 1920s because measures of ethnic preferences indicate that the war’s effect on 
preferences persisted through this decade.  The post-WWI period begins with the first 
Quarter Dividend Sale on February 13, 1929.  This final period includes the stock market 
                                                 
16 Arrival records are available at ancestry.com.  Ancestry’s database consists of an index to the passenger 
lists of ships arriving from foreign ports at the Port of New York from 1851 to 1891 and from 1935 to 
1938, along with the lists of passengers entering through Castle Garden between 1855 and 1890. 
17 The Jewish German variable may be subject to measurement error if a ship’s port of departure differs 
from a family’s country of origin.  Specifically, the variable may be biased towards countries that are closer 
to the United States, and particularly towards Britain.  For example, a ship could pick up an immigrant in 
Hamburg and make another stop in London before setting sail for the United States.  This may lead me to 
classify some German Jews as Anglo-Saxon. 
  13crash on Black Thursday, October 24, 1929 and the Great Depression.  The data end on 
October 1, 1936, when the NYSE stopped recording black balls.  
  Data on other exchanges suggest that the NYSE faced significant competition 
during the war.  Since the early 19
th century, the NYSE had competed with an active curb 
market, bucket shops, and specialized exchanges, including the Coal Hole, the New York 
Gold Exchange, and the Open Board of Stock Brokers (Eames 1894, p.43).  Its most 
formidable competitor, however, the Consolidated Stock Exchange of New York, was 
most active in the 1920s.  Close to 2,000 seats at the Consolidated were “available for a 
few hundred dollars, no questions asked” (Sobel 1972, p.29).  When the Consolidated 
began trading NYSE stocks, bid-ask spreads at the NYSE fell by roughly 10 percent; 
until 1926, it held nearly a quarter of the market (Brown, Mulherin, and Weidenmier 
2006).  Thus, competition may have mitigated the effects of ethnic bias during the war. 
 
IV. Effects on the Probability of Rejection 
  Applications data show that rejection rates for German applicants nearly doubled 
after the beginning of the war (Table 1).  Before the war, 4 percent of German applicants 
were rejected on grounds of “personal and financial integrity.”  After 1914, 8 percent of 
Germans were rejected.  In the post-war period, rejection rates dropped back to 1 percent.  
In contrast, rejection rates for Anglo-Saxons decreased during the war from 2.9 to 2.4 
percent and increased slightly after the war to 2.5 percent.  
  Linear probability and logit regressions with and without annual fixed effects 
measure the effects of time-ethnicity interactions on rejection rates (Figure 6 for linear 
  14probability, Tables 2 and 3 for logit models).
18  Four ethnicity variables distinguish 
Anglo-Saxon, German, Jewish, and Other Ethnicities.  Anglo-Saxons are the control 
ethnicity because they are the largest and socially dominant group.  The variables pre-
WWI and WWI account for period effects, while post-WWI acts as the control.  Time-
ethnicity interactions such as WWI * German Buyer estimate differences-in-differences 
over time and across ethnicities.
 
  
The last line of equation (1) includes controls for Nominal transactions, Quarter Dividend 
Sales, and sales by the Committee of Admissions.  Rejection rates may be lower for 
nominal sales because such sales typically occurred within firms and may therefore be 
subject to less interference by the NYSE.  In contrast, rejection rates may be higher 
during the Quarter Dividend Sale if the sudden increase in the supply of memberships 
lowered the quality of marginal applicants.  Finally, rejection rates may be lower for sales 
that were administered by the Committee of Admissions if the Committee used discretion 
in selecting applicants instead of selling to the highest bidder.  
  A linear regression of rejection rates on German Buyer, including these controls, 
suggests that rejections for Germans increased significantly at the beginning of the war 
(Figure 6).
19  For most years prior to World War I, German ethnicity had no effect on the 
probability of rejection.  In 1912 and 1914, however, German Americans faced a 40 to 50 
                                                 
18 Probit regressions yield similar results. 
19 Figure 6 reports coefficients for German Buyer in a linear probability regression, run separately by year, 
and controlling for ethnicities, nominal transactions, Quarter Dividend Sales and sales by the Committee.   
  15percent higher risk of rejection than Anglo-Saxons.  This effect persisted at a lower level 
until 1928, and took off to a second peak in 1934, when Hitler took power in Germany.   
  Logit regressions confirm that the war increased rejection rates for Germans.  The 
coefficient for the time-ethnicity interaction WWI * German Buyer is large and positive at 
2.0 to 2.2 (Table 2, significant at 5 percent).  In comparison, the coefficient for pre-WWI 
* German Buyer stays between 1.1 and 1.3 (Table 2, not statistically significant).  These 
results imply that World War I more than doubled the differences in the probabilities of 
rejection between Germans and Anglo-Saxons from 6 to more than 13 percent.
20  Results 
are robust to controlling for stock market conditions with annual fixed effects; 
coefficients for WWI * German Buyer are significantly larger than coefficients for pre-
WWI * German Buyer (1.8 to 2.0 at 5 percent, Table 3).
21  Time-ethnicity interactions are 
not significant for any other ethnicity, and Quarter Dividend Sale has no effect.
22 
 
A. Analyzing Individual Votes through Black Balls  
  Data on black balls make it possible to examine changes in admissions at the level 
of individual votes.  Ordinary least squares regressions of black balls in Tables 4 and 5 
re-estimate the logit regressions in Tables 2 and 3 with black balls as the dependent 
                                                 
20 Marginal probabilities are calculated from the coefficients at the sample means.  For example, the effect 
of being German on the probability of rejection is: G(βo+ βGermanXGerman+ βJewisXJewish + …  +βNominalXNominal)  
- G(βo+ βJewishXJewish …+βNominalXNominal), where G(.) is the cumulative probability function of the logistic 
distribution.  Chunrong Ai and Edward C. Norton (2003) show that these effects are approximate.  Their 
correction focuses on interactions between two continuous variables, whereas regressions in the current 
paper examine interactions between binary variables.  I use Ai and Norton’s algorithm to measure the size 
of the bias.  It can handle only a single interaction variable, and I estimate a restricted model with 
WWI*German as the only interaction variable to match this constraint.  In that model, differences between 
the approximate calculation and Ai and Norton’s corrected method are negligible.   
21 Regressions with annual fixed effects do not include time dummies because time dummies would only 
capture differences within 1914.  For example, the variable WWI would measure differences in rejections 
before and after June 28, 1914.  Data for nine years are dropped from regressions with annual fixed effects 
because no applicant was rejected.   
22 I have performed alternative tests breaking up Other Ethnicity into more finely-grained ethnic categories, 
including Italian, Russian, and Dutch.  None of these ethnicities experience a comparable effect of the war. 
  16variable.  These regressions show that the share of black balls against Germans more than 
doubled after 1914.  Coefficients on the time-ethnicity interaction for German applicants 
increase from 0.3 and 0.4 for pre-WWI * German (not statistically significant, Table 4) to 
0.7 and 0.8 for WWI * German (significant at 1 percent, Table 4).  Regressions with 
annual fixed effects confirm these results (Table 5, with an increase from 0.3 and 0.4 for 
pre-WWI * German, not statistically significant, to 0.7 for WWI * German, significant at 
1 to 5 percent).  Thus, the black ball data confirm that World War I significantly lowered 
the probability that German Americans would be elected to the NYSE. 
 
V. Did the Increase in Rejections Reflect a Change in Productivity?   
  A potential alternative explanation for the increase in rejections of German traders 
is that World War I reduced their productivity relative to Anglo-Saxons.  The war 
impeded business with Germany, and German traders are likely to have conducted a 
larger share of this business.  As a result, their productivity may have suffered and thus 
triggered the increase in rejections.  To account for this, I examine changes in the share of 
Germans among business failures and exits from the Exchange, as well as in the share of 
applications. 
 
A.  No Increase in Defaults or Exits of German Traders 
NYSE members who had failed in business or violated trading rules were 
expelled.  Data on expulsions, however, yield little evidence of an effect of World War I 
on Germans.  Between 1915 and 1918, the number of expulsions increased from zero to 
seven, but only two of these expelled members were German (Figure 7).  This share is 
  17particularly low considering the negative ex ante assessment of German traders, which 
should have made them more vulnerable to expulsion.  A second spike follows in 1922, 
with six expulsions, including three Germans.  At that time, trading restrictions with 
Germany had been removed, but ethnic bias may have persisted, as measures of ethnic 
preferences suggest.  
Similarly, data on exits from the Exchange do not indicate that the war lowered 
the productivity of German traders.  The share of German sellers increased sharply in 
1898, from less than 9 percent to nearly 16 percent, but there is no effect of World War I.  
From 1900 to 1923 the share of German sellers fluctuated between 6 and 12 percent; it 
only jumped again in 1924 (to 15 percent, Figure 8).   
   
B. No Decline in German Applications 
  An additional check for productivity effects is to compare applications across 
ethnicities and over time.  Specifically, if World War I lowered the productivity of 
German traders, it may have discouraged Germans relative to other applicants.  The data, 
however, suggest that the share of German applicants increased during the war, from 7.6 
before 1914 to 9.1 percent during the war, and 9.2 percent after (Figure 9).
23  The share 
of Jewish applicants declined from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent after 1914, and recovered to 
9.3 percent after the war.  Unless World War I lowered the productivity of Jewish 
applicants, this dip in applications may reflect expectations of discrimination. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Demographic data from the U.S. Census of 1920 suggest that the “quality” of German applicants – 
measured by age, marital status, and home ownership – stayed roughly constant.   
  18C. World War I has Even Larger Effects on Jewish Germans 
Comparing the treatment of Jewish Germans and other Germans creates an 
additional test of ethnic bias.  A potential productivity effect of World War I should have 
favored Jewish Germans relative to other Germans if Jewish Germans were more likely 
to have established business relations outside of Germany.  For instance, historical 
records show that Jewish German firms, such as Singer Manasse, figured prominently at 
the London Stock Exchange prior to World War I.  After 1914, many of these firms 
moved from London to New York.  Michael Manasse, for example, came to the NYSE in 
1916 (Michie 1999, pp.158-159).  These arrivals performed well at the Exchange: 
The New York Stock Exchange, bolstered by the repurchase of dollar securities and the arrival 
of expertise from London, now became a serious challenger in international markets. (Michie 
1999, p.160) 
 
Although Jewish Germans may have been better insulated from the productivity 
effects of World War I, the NYSE data suggest that they suffered an even stronger 
increase in rejections than other Germans.  Logit regressions in Tables 6 and 7 repeat the 
analysis of Tables 2 and 3, distinguishing German Jewish from other Jewish applicants.  
In these regressions, the interaction variable WWI * German Jewish carries a large 
positive coefficient (2.3 to 2.4, significant at 5 percent, Table 6), which implies a 19 
percent increase in rejections.  In comparison, the interaction variable pre-WWI * 
German Jewish carries a coefficient of 0.7 to 0.8, which implies a 3 percent increase for 
the pre-war period.  Thus, these data suggest that World War I increased the probability 
of rejection for German Jews by a factor of six.  Logits with annual fixed effects 
corroborate these results (Table 7).   
This large increase in rejections suggests that World War I may have intensified a 
pre-existing bias against Jewish applicants.  The variable Jewish Buyer carries a positive 
  19coefficient of 0.7 to 0.8 (significant at 10 percent, Tables 2 and 3), which implies that 




VI. Changes in the Ethnic Composition of the Committee of Admissions 
  In addition to influencing admissions, ethnic preferences may also have 
influenced access to powerful positions within the Exchange.  To measure these effects, I 
examine changes in the ethnic composition of the Committee of Admissions.  Rules for 
selecting the Committee, which were in place from 1869 until the reorganization of the 
Exchange in 1938, ensured that the ethnic composition of the Committee changed only 
gradually.  Each May, the three longest-serving members of the Committee of 
Admissions were replaced by three new members (Eames 1894, pp.74-75).   
Changes in the ethnic composition of the Committee of Admissions suggest that 
World War I reduced the chances that Germans would be elected to influential positions 
within the Exchange.
25  In 1880, the 15-member Committee included 3 German traders 
(Figure 10).  Between 1913 and 1915, the number of Germans declined to 2, and by 
1921, only 1 German remained.  By 1930, the Committee again included 2 German 
members.   
In conjunction with the black ball data, these data indicate that the increase in 
rejections reflected a broad-based change in voting patterns at the NYSE rather than a 
switch in a small number of votes.  During the war, only one applicant was rejected by 
                                                 
24 When Jewish Buyers are separated into Jewish German and Other Jewish Buyers, black balls against 
Jewish German Buyers increase by 0.7 to 0.8 (significant at 1 percent) in regressions with time dummies, 
and by 0.6 to 0.7 (significant at 1 percent) in regressions with annual fixed effects.     
25 Committee members were identified from the Minutes of the Committee of Admissions (1904), Eames 
(1894), and the New York Stock Exchange Directory (1906, 1909, 1913-15, 1920, and 1930).  
  20less than a two-third majority.  On March 13, 1919, George Shaskan was rejected with 
three black balls.  Shaskan’s rejection, however, may have been due to the NYSE’s 
citizenship requirements:  Shaskan’s response to the 1920 Census reveals that he had 
arrived from Russia in 1891, and that his naturalization was still pending in 1920.  All 
other applicants were denied by an overwhelming majority. 
In sum, data on admissions decisions, black balls, and internal elections all 
indicate that World War I worsened the treatment of Germans at the NYSE.  These 
results are a strong indicator of taste-based discrimination.  The following section 
examines whether World War I had a similarly strong effect on the prices that Germans 
paid to be admitted to the Exchange. 
 
VII. Ethnicity and the Price of Admission 
This section examines the prices that Germans offered to enter the Exchange.  For 
the majority of sales, prices were set in direct negotiations between members who 
planned to leave the Exchange and prospective buyers who wanted to become members.  
Sellers only interacted with buyers for as long as it took to agree on a price.  Thus, in 
contrast to the remaining members, sellers’ incentives to discriminate may have been 
limited.  If they did in fact discriminate, the data should show higher prices for Germans 
buyers (relative to Anglo-Saxons) during World War I.   
The ideal test of discrimination would compare prices under identical conditions, 
for seats that were sold on the same day.  Seats were, however, only sold every two 
weeks and the number of transactions is too small to estimate effects even on a monthly 
  21basis.  Thus the data only allow for regressions with annual fixed effects (Table 8),
26 and 
regressions with time-period dummy variables provide robustness checks (Table 9).  The 
analysis replicates that of rejection rates, except that price regressions add a dummy 
variable for Same Ethnicity, which tests whether sellers favored buyers of their own 
ethnicity, and a dummy variable for Rejected, which tests whether sellers anticipated 
rejections and charged higher prices to compensate. 
 
  In contrast to rejection data, price data show no effect of ethnic preferences.   
Coefficients for the variable in Table 9 indicate that WWI raised the price for German 
applicants by approximately 3 percent (11 to 14 percent for WWI * German Buyer, 
compared with 9 to 11 percent for pre-WWI * German Buyer).  This effect, however, 
disappears in regressions with controls for stock market conditions: With annual fixed 
effects the coefficient for WWI * German Buyer is close to zero and not statistically 
significant (Table 8, pre-WWI * German Buyer is also close to zero).
27     
  Moreover, there is little proof that German sellers favored buyers of their own 
ethnicity, and coefficients for same ethnicity interactions are not significant.  Without 
fixed effects, a coefficient of -0.13 on the interaction German Buyer and Seller * WWI 
implies a price reduction of 13 percent (Table 9).  This effect, however, is not statistically 
                                                 
26 Bi-annual fixed effects can compare a larger number of sales, but they do less to control for stock market 
conditions.  Regressions with bi-annual fixed effects yield results that are qualitatively similar to 
regressions with annual fixed effects, albeit with slightly smaller standard errors.   
27 Separating Jewish Germans from other Jews does not show a price increase for Jewish Germans.  
  22significant and disappears with the inclusion of time fixed effects.
28  Buyers whose 
applications are rejected offer on average 9 percent less for a seat (Table 9), but this 
effect also disappears with the inclusion of time fixed effects.  
  There is some evidence, however, that Jewish buyers paid slightly higher prices 
during World War I.  With annual fixed effects, coefficients for WWI * Jewish Buyer 
indicate that Jewish applicants paid a 5 to 7 percent markup during the war, which, 
compared with a 2 to 4 percent markup before 1914, implies a price increase of 3 percent 
(Table 8).  Regressions with period dummies suggest a markup of 16 to 22 percent after 
1914 and 5 to 12 percent before, which implies a price increase of 10 percent (Table 9).    
  The data also show that seats of deceased or expelled members, which were 
auctioned by the Committee of Admissions, sold at a discount (nearly 13 percent, Table 
9).  This discount, however, also disappears with the inclusion of time fixed effects 
(Table 8).
29   
  The most significant price effect occurs for buyers who purchased their seats as 
part of the Quarter Dividend Sale.  In such transactions, buyers negotiated with four 
sellers instead of one.  The NYSE data show that these buyers paid on average 9 percent 
more than they would have paid in a regular sale at the same time (Table 8).  These 
results suggest that economic considerations were a more powerful determinant of prices 
than were ethnic preferences.
30  
 
                                                 
28 The corresponding variable Jewish Buyer and Seller * WWI shows no significant effect. 
29 There is no evidence that the Committee favored certain ethnicities in its own sales.  Interactions between 
ethnicity variables and the Committee of Admissions yield no statistically significant coefficients.  
30 Another characteristic of transactions during the Quarter Dividend Sale is that sellers remained at the 
Exchange and may therefore have been more likely to discriminate.  Unfortunately, the Quarter Dividend 
Sale occurs in 1929, when the effect of World War I on ethnic preferences had already lost its force.   
  23VIII. Conclusions 
Quantitative measures of ethnic preferences based on German-language operas, 
naming practices, and food purchases establish that World War I resulted in a strong and 
persistent shift in ethnic preferences, which effectively converted German Americans to 
an ethnic minority.  This paper has analyzed a new data set on more than 4,000 applicants 
to the NYSE to test whether this shift in preferences affected the prospects of German 
Americans’ to be admitted to the NYSE.  Admissions data reveal that the war more than 
doubled rejection rates for Germans (relative to Anglo-Saxons). 
  Despite the strong effect on rejections, the data yield no evidence that Germans 
paid a premium to enter the Exchange.  The reason for this divergence is likely to lie in 
the institutional characteristics of the admissions process:  An applicant to the NYSE 
negotiates a price with a member who plans to exit the Exchange.  It is, however, not the 
seller, but a committee of remaining members, that evaluates his application.  Remaining 
members do not benefit from higher prices, but they expect to interact with the applicant 
for a long time.  Thus, applicants cannot compensate their future peers, who are most 
affected by their characteristics, for ethnic bias.   
Similar set-ups of separated decision-making on prices and admissions are present 
in many labor market settings where co-workers may hold discriminatory tastes.  For 
instance, minority applicants may be willing to accept lower wages in their negotiations 
with the human resource manager of a law firm or investment bank, but their prospective 
co-workers, and not human resources, decide whom to admit.  Similarly, minority buyers 
can offer higher prices to the owner of a condo, but the condo board, and not the seller, 
  24decides on applications.  The results of this paper suggest that taste-based discrimination 
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ANGLO-SAXON        
Applications 1,207 707 1,085  2,999 
Rejected 2.9% 2.4%  2.50% 2.60% 
Nominal 11.0% 19.2%  23.00% 17.30% 
GERMAN       
Applications 149 117 169  435 
Rejected 4.0% 7.7%  1.20% 3.90% 
Nominal 4.0% 12.0%  19.50% 12.20% 
JEWISH       
Applications 147 105 173  425 
Rejected 3.4% 10.5%  5.20% 5.90% 
Nominal 10.2% 17.1%  12.10% 12.70% 
OTHER ETHNICITIES       
Applications 467 309 462  1,238 
Rejected 3.0% 5.2%  3.50% 3.70% 
Nominal 11.3% 13.9%  18.80% 14.80% 
       
ALL ETHNICITIES       
Applications 1,970 1,238 1,889  5,097 
Rejected 3.0% 4.3%  2.90%  3.30%   
Nominal 10.5% 17.0%  20.70%  15.90%   
Notes: Data on the identities of applicants, seat prices and admissions decisions were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange. Names 
were matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Prices are in year 2000 U.S. dollars.   
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TABLE 2 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES: COEFFICIENTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
German Buyer  -0.723 -0.788 -0.785 -0.787 -0.757 
   [0.739] [0.738] [0.738] [0.738] [0.738] 
Jewish Buyer  0.721 0.674 0.673 0.679 0.766 
   [0.397]+ [0.395]+ [0.395]+ [0.395]+ [0.394]+ 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.353  0.31  0.313 0.307 0.341 
   [0.324] [0.322] [0.322] [0.321] [0.321] 
Pre-WWI  0.017 0.112 0.124 0.061 0.157 
   [0.333] [0.330] [0.330] [0.260] [0.260] 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  1.292 1.071 1.073 1.075 1.097 
   [0.876] [0.865] [0.865] [0.865] [0.864] 
Pre-WWI * Jewish Buyer  -0.27  -0.519 -0.514 -0.521 -0.601 
   [0.643] [0.627] [0.627] [0.627] [0.626] 
Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  -0.14 -0.279  -0.276 -0.27 -0.306 
   [0.468] [0.455] [0.455] [0.454] [0.454] 
WWI  -0.127 -0.02 -0.004  -0.067  -0.035 
   [0.378] [0.374] [0.373] [0.314] [0.313] 
WWI * German Buyer  2.163 1.958  1.95  1.951 1.975 
   [0.861]* [0.852]* [0.852]* [0.852]* [0.851]* 
WWI * Jewish Buyer  1.117 0.881 0.876  0.87  0.792 
   [0.581]+  [0.565] [0.565] [0.565] [0.563] 
WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.594 0.445 0.442 0.449 0.455 
   [0.493] [0.480] [0.480] [0.479] [0.478] 
Nominal  -1.166 -1.16 -1.179  -1.192  - 
   [0.350]** [0.350]** [0.349]** [0.347]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.12 0.116  0.094  -  - 
   [0.300] [0.299] [0.297]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.504  0.126  - - - 
   [0.271]+  [0.198]  - - - 
Constant  -3.605 -3.577 -3.554  -3.49  -3.668 
   [0.285]** [0.287]** [0.284]** [0.197]** [0.195]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes No No No No 
Observations (Applications)  5,097 5,097 5,097 5,097 5,097 
Pseudo R-squared  0.034 0.032 0.031 0.031  0.02 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish applicants. During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional 
quarter of a membership which he could sell.  These applications are treated as four separate transactions since they 
involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    3
TABLE 3 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS: COEFFICIENTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
German Buyer  -0.747 -0.795 -0.796 -0.784 -0.752 
   [0.741] [0.740] [0.740] [0.740] [0.739] 
Jewish Buyer  0.761 0.722 0.721 0.749 0.831 
   [0.399]+ [0.397]+ [0.397]+ [0.396]+ [0.395]* 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.369 0.336 0.336 0.338 0.387 
   [0.324] [0.323] [0.323] [0.323] [0.322] 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  1.615 1.371  1.37  1.356 1.379 
   [0.890]+  [0.872] [0.872] [0.871] [0.871] 
Pre-WWI * Jewish Buyer  -0.267 -0.477 -0.477 -0.506 -0.561 
   [0.654] [0.636] [0.636] [0.635] [0.635] 
Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  -0.188 -0.326 -0.328 -0.331 -0.377 
   [0.478] [0.461] [0.461] [0.461] [0.460] 
WWI * German Buyer  1.98  1.786 1.789 1.763 1.776 
   [0.861]* [0.852]* [0.852]* [0.850]* [0.848]* 
WWI * Jewish Buyer  0.968 0.777 0.779 0.727 0.659 
   [0.578]+  [0.562] [0.562] [0.557] [0.554] 
WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.489 0.348 0.348 0.333  0.31 
   [0.488] [0.473] [0.473] [0.471] [0.469] 
Nominal  -1.09  -1.091 -1.085 -1.125  - 
   [0.353]** [0.353]** [0.351]** [0.349]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.376 0.371 0.376  -  - 
   [0.413] [0.414] [0.413]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.3  -0.041  - - - 
   [0.281]  [0.207]  - - - 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes No No No No 
Groups (Years)  45 45 45 45 45 
Observations (Applications)  4,653 4,653 4,653 4,653 4,653 
Pseudo R-squared  0.034 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.019 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish applicants.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional 
quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four separate 
transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and 
** at 1 percent.    4
TABLE 4 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1973, WITH TIME DUMMIES 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH AND OTHER JEWISH BUYERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS NUMBER OF BLACK BALLS (VOTES OPPOSING AN APPLICATION) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
German Buyer  -0.083 -0.107 -0.106 -0.106 -0.096 
   [0.173] [0.172] [0.172] [0.172] [0.173] 
German Jewish Buyer  -0.312 -0.314 -0.314 -0.315 -0.293 
   [0.216] [0.215] [0.215] [0.215] [0.215] 
Other Jewish Buyer  0.772 0.734 0.733 0.732 0.772 
   [0.253]** [0.252]** [0.252]** [0.252]** [0.252]** 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.153 0.136 0.137 0.138  0.15 
   [0.116] [0.116] [0.116] [0.115] [0.115] 
Pre-WWI  -0.139 -0.109 -0.101 -0.096 -0.064 
   [0.109] [0.108] [0.108] [0.087] [0.087] 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  0.36  0.272 0.273 0.273 0.284 
   [0.257] [0.249] [0.249] [0.249] [0.249] 
Pre-WWI * German Jewish Buyer  0.29  0.289 0.294 0.294 0.283 
   [0.331] [0.316] [0.316] [0.316] [0.317] 
Pre-WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  -0.072 -0.333 -0.333 -0.332 -0.381 
   [0.382] [0.368] [0.368] [0.368] [0.368] 
Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  -0.095 -0.149 -0.148 -0.149 -0.162 
   [0.166] [0.162] [0.162] [0.161] [0.162] 
WWI  -0.121 -0.09 -0.081  -0.077  -0.066 
   [0.119] [0.118] [0.118] [0.100] [0.100] 
WWI * German Buyer  0.81  0.739 0.735 0.735 0.745 
   [0.273]** [0.269]** [0.269]** [0.269]** [0.269]** 
WWI * German Jewish Buyer  0.814 0.802 0.798 0.799 0.785 
   [0.344]* [0.338]* [0.338]* [0.338]* [0.338]* 
WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  0.85  0.604 0.602 0.603 0.569 
   [0.446]+  [0.436] [0.436] [0.436] [0.436] 
WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.149 0.099 0.097 0.096 0.097 
   [0.187] [0.184] [0.184] [0.183] [0.184] 
Nominal  -0.269 -0.27 -0.279  -0.278  - 
    [0.082]** [0.082]** [0.082]** [0.080]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.002 0.005 -0.007  -  - 
   [0.101] [0.101] [0.100]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.213  0.078  - - - 
   [0.101]*  [0.077]  - - - 
Constant  0.433 0.437 0.451 0.447 0.383 
   [0.094]** [0.094]** [0.093]** [0.066]** [0.063]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes No No No No 
Observations (Applications)  4,998 4,998 4,998 4,998 4,998 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange. Votes are by members of the 
NYSE’s Committee of Admissions; the Committee has 15 members and votes when at least 10 members are present. 
Black balls were recorded until 1936.  As a first step, names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that 
uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German Jewish last names are identified based on 
the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  
During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional quarter of a membership which he 
could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four separate transactions because they involve 
different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    5
TABLE 5 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH AND OTHER JEWISH BUYERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS NUMBER OF BLACK BALLS (VOTES OPPOSING AN APPLICATION) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
German Buyer  -0.089  -0.114 -0.113 -0.106 -0.097 
   [0.173]  [0.172] [0.172] [0.172] [0.172] 
German Jewish Buyer  -0.278  -0.278 -0.278 -0.274 -0.253 
   [0.215]  [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] 
Other Jewish Buyer  0.769  0.732 0.731 0.756 0.794 
   [0.252]** [0.252]** [0.252]** [0.251]** [0.251]**
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.169  0.154 0.155 0.156 0.174 
   [0.116]  [0.116] [0.116] [0.116] [0.116] 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  0.442  0.352 0.352 0.344 0.357 
   [0.257]+  [0.249] [0.249] [0.249] [0.249] 
Pre-WWI * German Jewish Buyer  0.285  0.299 0.300 0.295 0.288 
   [0.331]  [0.316] [0.316] [0.316] [0.316] 
Pre-WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  -0.092  -0.342 -0.342 -0.367 -0.411 
   [0.381]  [0.368] [0.368] [0.367] [0.368] 
Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer -0.123  -0.171 -0.170 -0.172 -0.189 
   [0.166]  [0.162] [0.162] [0.162] [0.162] 
WWI * German Buyer  0.738  0.665 0.664 0.650 0.657 
   [0.272]** [0.268]* [0.268]* [0.268]* [0.268]* 
WWI * German Jewish Buyer  0.699  0.696 0.695 0.683 0.669 
   [0.343]*  [0.337]* [0.337]* [0.337]* [0.337]* 
WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  0.902  0.664 0.664 0.620 0.585 
   [0.446]*  [0.436] [0.436] [0.435] [0.435] 
WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.105  0.059 0.059 0.052 0.046 
   [0.186]  [0.182] [0.182] [0.182] [0.183] 
Nominal  -0.247  -0.246 -0.249 -0.267  - 
   [0.083]** [0.083]** [0.082]** [0.081]** - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.204  0.208 0.206  -  - 
   [0.143]  [0.143] [0.143]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.144  0.019 -  -  - 
   [0.102]  [0.078] -  -  - 
Constant  0.312 0.334 0.339 0.388 0.341 
  [0.057]** [0.056]** [0.053]** [0.040]** [0.038]**
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes No No No No 
Groups (Years)  54 54 54 54 54 
Observations (Applications)  4,998 4,998 4,998 4,998 4,998 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange. Votes are by members of the 
NYSE’s Committee of Admissions; the Committee has 15 members and votes when at least ten members are present. 
Black balls were recorded until 1936.  As a first step, names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that 
uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German Jewish last names are identified based on 
the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  
During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional quarter of a membership which he 
could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four separate transactions because they involve 
different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    6
TABLE 6 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES: COEFFICIENTS 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH FROM OTHER JEWISH BUYERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
German Buyer  -0.723 -0.788 -0.786 -0.787 -0.757 
   [0.739] [0.738] [0.738] [0.738] [0.738] 
German Jewish Buyer  -0.994 -0.996 -0.996 -0.994 -0.927 
   [1.026] [1.024] [1.024] [1.024] [1.024] 
Other Jewish Buyer  1.515 1.454 1.452 1.459 1.573 
   [0.427]** [0.425]** [0.425]** [0.424]** [0.422]** 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.352 0.309 0.312 0.307 0.341 
   [0.324] [0.322] [0.322] [0.321] [0.321] 
Pre-WWI  0  0.096 0.109 0.061 0.157 
   [0.333] [0.330] [0.329] [0.260] [0.260] 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  1.291 1.072 1.074 1.075 1.097 
   [0.876] [0.865] [0.865] [0.865] [0.864] 
Pre-WWI * German Jewish Buyer  0.706 0.743 0.752 0.749 0.712 
   [1.295] [1.261] [1.261] [1.261] [1.261] 
Pre-WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  -0.499 -0.891 -0.891 -0.899 -1.041 
   [0.759] [0.749] [0.749] [0.749] [0.747] 
Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  -0.139 -0.277 -0.275  -0.27  -0.306 
   [0.468] [0.455] [0.455] [0.454] [0.454] 
WWI  -0.145 -0.036 -0.019 -0.067 -0.035 
   [0.377] [0.373] [0.372] [0.314] [0.313] 
WWI * German Buyer  2.162 1.959  1.95  1.951 1.975 
   [0.861]* [0.852]* [0.852]* [0.852]* [0.851]* 
WWI * German Jewish Buyer  2.35  2.334 2.328 2.325 2.279 
   [1.157]* [1.137]* [1.137]* [1.137]* [1.136]* 
WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  0.906 0.445 0.441 0.434 0.306 
   [0.707] [0.691] [0.690] [0.690] [0.686] 
WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.595 0.447 0.444 0.449 0.455 
   [0.493] [0.480] [0.480] [0.479] [0.478] 
Nominal  -1.168 -1.158 -1.177 -1.186  - 
    [0.351]** [0.351]** [0.349]** [0.347]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.093 0.094 0.071  -  - 
   [0.301] [0.301] [0.299]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.501  0.13  - - - 
   [0.271]+  [0.199]  - - - 
Constant  -3.587 -3.563 -3.539 -3.491 -3.668 
   [0.285]** [0.286]** [0.283]** [0.198]** [0.195]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes No No No No 
Observations (Applications)  5,072 5,097 5,097 5,097 5,097 
Pseudo R-squared  0.044 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.027 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  As a first step, names are matched to 
ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German 
Jewish last names are identified based on the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that 
entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one 
additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four 
separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 
percent, and ** at 1 percent.    7
TABLE 7 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS: COEFFICIENTS 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH AND OTHER JEWISH BUYERS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
German Buyer  -0.742  -0.789 -0.79  -0.78 -0.747 
   [0.741] [0.740] [0.740] [0.740] [0.739] 
German Jewish Buyer  -0.947 -0.934 -0.934 -0.928  -0.86 
   [1.027] [1.025] [1.025] [1.025] [1.024] 
Other Jewish Buyer  1.575 1.502 1.502 1.546 1.651 
   [0.433]** [0.430]** [0.430]** [0.426]** [0.425]** 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.37 0.34 0.34  0.342  0.392 
   [0.324] [0.323] [0.323] [0.323] [0.323] 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  1.608 1.363 1.361  1.35  1.372 
   [0.890]+  [0.872] [0.872] [0.871] [0.871] 
Pre-WWI * German Jewish Buyer  0.785 0.878 0.876 0.869  0.85 
   [1.305] [1.268] [1.268] [1.268] [1.268] 
Pre-WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  -0.627 -0.989 -0.988 -1.032 -1.135 
   [0.778] [0.765] [0.765] [0.763] [0.761] 
Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  -0.188 -0.33 -0.332  -0.334  -0.381 
   [0.478] [0.461] [0.461] [0.461] [0.460] 
WWI * German Buyer  1.968 1.775 1.778 1.757 1.767 
   [0.861]* [0.852]* [0.851]* [0.850]* [0.848]* 
WWI * German Jewish Buyer  2.073 2.095 2.096 2.075 2.033 
   [1.157]+ [1.137]+ [1.137]+ [1.136]+ [1.134]+ 
WWI * Other Jewish Buyer  0.913  0.58  0.582 0.508 0.389 
   [0.720] [0.698] [0.698] [0.688] [0.683] 
WWI * Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.484 0.342 0.341 0.328 0.302 
   [0.488] [0.472] [0.472] [0.470] [0.468] 
Nominal  -1.098 -1.095 -1.089 -1.121  - 
   [0.353]** [0.353]** [0.352]** [0.349]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.274 0.294  0.3  -  - 
   [0.413] [0.413] [0.411]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  -0.742  -0.789 -0.79  -0.78 -0.747 
   [0.741] [0.740] [0.740] [0.740] [0.739] 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes No No No No 
Groups (Years)  45 45 45 45 45 
Observations (Applications)  4,653 4,653 4,653 4,653 4,653 
Pseudo R-squared  0.046  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.028 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  As a first step, names are matched to 
ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German 
Jewish last names are identified based on the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that 
entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one 
additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four 
separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 
percent, and ** at 1 percent.  
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TABLE 8 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG PRICE OF A SEAT IN YEAR 2000 US DOLLARS 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI 
German Buyer  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Jewish Buyer  -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.018 
  [0.013]+ [0.013]+ [0.012]+ [0.012]* [0.012]*  [0.012] 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.027 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
  [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  0.009 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Pre-WWI * Jewish Buyer  0.036 0.035 0.035 0.026 0.026  0.02 
  [0.019]+ [0.019]+ [0.019]+  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.018] 
-0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017  Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity 
    [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
WWI * German Buyer  0.009 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.003 
  [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
WWI * Jewish Buyer  0.066 0.066 0.066 0.058 0.058 0.047 
  [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.020]**  [0.020]* 
-0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018  WWI * Other Ethnicity 
    [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093  - 
  [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]**  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.001  -  - 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]  -  - 
0.017  0.017  - - - -  German Buyer and Seller * 
     WWI   [0.053]  [0.053]  - - - - 
Rejected  0.008  - - - - - 
  [0.013]  - - - - - 
Constant  13.939 13.939 13.941 13.942 13.943 13.964 
  [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** 
Committee Ethnicity 
   Interactions  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Same Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  Yes No No No No 
Groups (Years)  54 54 54 54 54 54 
Observations (Applications)  4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  “Jewish” includes German 
Jewish as well as other Jewish applicants, following the original classification.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, 
each existing member received one additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These 
applications are treated as four separate transactions because they involved different sellers and prices.  Prices for 
these transactions are multiplied by a factor of four. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 
percent.    9
TABLE 9 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG PRICE OF A SEAT IN YEAR 2000 US DOLLARS 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
German Buyer  0.012 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.007 -0.012 
  [0.048] [0.048] [0.045] [0.044] [0.045] [0.048] 
Jewish Buyer  -0.064 -0.067 -0.061 -0.062 -0.061 -0.012 
  [0.046] [0.046] [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.046] 
Other Ethnicity Buyer  0.026  0.025 0.02 0.023 0.02 -0.029 
  [0.033] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.033] 
Pre-WWI  -0.978 -0.977 -0.977 -0.978 -0.989 -1.479 
  [0.029]** [0.029]** [0.029]** [0.029]** [0.029]** [0.024]** 
Pre-WWI * German Buyer  0.108 0.106 0.102 0.091 0.087 0.106 
  [0.064]+  [0.064] [0.064] [0.062] [0.062] [0.067] 
Pre-WWI * Jewish Buyer  0.118 0.121 0.112 0.105  0.1  0.051 
  [0.065]+ [0.065]+ [0.065]+ [0.062]+  [0.062]  [0.067] 
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.068  Pre-WWI * Other Ethnicity 
    [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.045] 
WWI  -0.613 -0.612 -0.612 -0.613 -0.629 -1.119 
  [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.029]** 
WWI * German Buyer  0.143 0.138 0.121 0.113  0.12  0.138 
  [0.073]+  [0.073]+  [0.070]+ [0.069] [0.069]+  [0.075]+ 
WWI * Jewish Buyer  0.218 0.212 0.209 0.203 0.207 0.158 
  [0.072]** [0.072]** [0.072]** [0.070]** [0.070]**  [0.076]* 
0.015 0.012 0.012 0.019 0.022 0.071  WWI * Other Ethnicity 
    [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] [0.051] 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.699 0.698 0.698 0.697  0.72  - 
  [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.027]**  - 
Committee of Admissions  -0.127 -0.129 -0.129 -0.127  -  - 
  [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.019]**  -  - 
-0.127  -0.132  - - - -  German Buyer and Seller *  
   WWI   [0.183]  [0.183]  - - - - 
Rejected  -0.09  - - - - - 
  [0.045]*  - - - - - 
Constant  14.357 14.355  14.36  14.361 14.338 14.828 
  [0.028]** [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.018]** 
Committee Ethnic. Interact.  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Same Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  Yes No No No No 
Observations (Applications)  4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 
R-squared  0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66  0.6 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish last names, following the original classification.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each 
existing member received one additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These 
applications are treated as four separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices.  Prices for these 




































Notes: Data on operas are collected from historical schedules of performances in the online archives of the 
Metropolitan Opera in New York.  German-language composers include Austrian and Bohemian composers. 
 
 


















Notes: Data are constructed by counting the number of children with the name Otto or Wilhelm born between 
1911 and 1919 and recorded in the United States Census of 1920.  To scale the series in one graph, the number 
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Notes: The ethnic composition is computed by adding buyers to the stock of existing members and subtracting 
sellers.  Buyers’ and sellers’ names are collected from the ledgers of transactions in the archives of the NYSE.  
Names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific 
naming practices. 
 
  2 
 
 






















Notes: Data on names and election outcomes are collected at the archives of the NYSE.  Names are matched to 
ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices. 
 
 




































Notes: Coefficients per year for the variable German Buyer in a linear probability regression that controls for 


























































Notes:  Names of expelled members are collected from annotations in the ledgers of transactions at the NYSE 
archives.  German and Jewish members are identified by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and 
location-specific naming practices.  German Jews are distinguished from other Jews using passenger lists of 


















































Notes:  Sellers’ names are collected from the ledgers of transactions at the NYSE archives.  German and Jewish 
members are identified by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming 
practices.  German Jews are distinguished from other Jews using passenger lists of immigrant ships that arrived 



























Notes: Applicants’ names are collected from the ledgers of transactions in the archives of the NYSE.  Names are 


















Anglo-Saxon German Jewish Other
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Notes: The Committee of Admissions had 15 members, whose names are drawn from the Minutes of the 
Committee of Admissions (1904), Francis Eames (1894), and the New York Stock Exchange Directory.  
Members are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific 
naming practices; this information was supplemented with information from obituaries in the New York Times 
and census records. 
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